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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
not show sufficient direct and particular financial interest.61 No other
case appealed since 1940 involving religion and the public schools
has raised the question of Bible reading.62 Eventually the Court will
be called upon to decide whether there is a permissible area in
which the Bible may be used in the public schools under the first
amendment. Whether the Court will be guided by the reasoning of
one group of state cases or the other, or will devise a new approach,
cannot be predicted; but when the question is presented to the Court
it will have been ground out through the processes herein described.
THOMAS J. TRImBLE
PSYCHIATRIC CHALLENGE OF WITNESSES
Although insane' persons were incompetent as witnesses at early
common law,2 the modern view is that the effect of mental illness upon
competency is a preliminary question for the court 3 in the absence of
contrary statutory direction.4 An insane person is generally said to be
a competent witness if he can understand the sanctions imposed to
elicit the truth and can correctly recount the occurrence which is the
subject of his testimony.5 Some courts exclude evidence of insanity
offered for purposes of impeachment 6 but most courts admit such
61. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (three dissenting justices
felt that the merits of the case should have been considered).
62. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (dismissed time program sus-
tained); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time pro-
gram held unconstitutional).
1. Insanity is a purely legal concept, having different definitions in its dif-
ferent applications. OVERHOLSER, THE PsYcHrATRIST AND THE LAW 61 (1953).
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the term will be considered to in-
clude any mental illness materially affecting competency or credibility.
2. Livingston v. Kiersted, 10 Johns. 362 (N.Y. 1813); 2 WIGmoRE, EVMoNcr.
§ 492 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIGMORE); 58 AM. Jun., Witnesses
§ 118 (1948).
3. Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1892); McCoMvc,
EVIDENcE § 62 (1954) (hereinafter cited as McCouvucK); 2 WIGMORE § 487;
58 Am. JuR., Witnesses § 118 (1948).
4. Most state statutes concerning the effect of insanity upon competency
have been held to be merely declaratory of the common law. Holler v.
Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 139 P.2d 846 (1943); McCoRMIcK § 62;
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE 78 (A.L.I. 1954) (hereinafter cited as
MORGAN); 58 Am. JuR., Witnesses § 119(1949). However, Texas and Indiana
have construed their statutes more strictly. See Annot., 148 A.L.R. 1147
(1944), 26 A.L.R. 1499 (1923). And for a state-by-state treatment, see 2
WIGmORE § 488.
5. District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519 (1882); Bowdle v. Detroit
St. Ry., 103 Mich. 272, 61 N.W. 529 (1894); McCoRMIcK § 45; MORGAN 78; 2
WiGMORE § 492; 58 Am. Jun., Witnesses § 118 (1948); Annot., 148 A.L.R.
1141 (1944), 26 A.L.R. 1493 (1923). For a criticism of this test, see McCoR-
MIcK § 62.
6. People v. Dye, 81 Cal. App. 2d 952, 185 P.2d 624 (1947); State v. Driver,
88 W. Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921); see State v. Mohr, 99 N.J.L. 124, 122
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evidence,7 treating medical and lay testimony with equal respect8
because of the refusal of the earlier cases to consider insanity as
exclusively within the province of experts.9
The recent advances in psychiatry, or the medical study of the
mind,10 have led to an increasing use of the testimony of psychiatrists
to challenge adverse witnesses on the grounds of insanity, in spite of
the fact that the legal term "insanity" has no psychiatric significance."
The general respect for the medical profession, coupled with the re-
luctance of most medical people to speak in nonmedical terms, permits
psychiatrists to be led-willingly or not-to more dogmatic positions
than non-psychiatrists on the question of whether a witness' mental
Atl. 837 (1923). The evidence is generally excluded if it does not relate to
mental condition either at the time of trial or at the time of the occurrence
testified to. Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (psy-
chiatric treatment twenty months earlier); People v. Harrison, 18 Cal. App.
288, 123 Pac. 200 (1912) (insane two years earlier); State v. Hayward, 62
Minn. 474, 65 N.W. 63 (1895) (general mental aberations, occurrence and
duration not specified); State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 Pac. 1027 (1899)
(evidence, including army discharge, tending to show feeble-mindedness and
amorality). The statement of a general rule concerning the mental condi-
tion of girls in period of maturation was excluded in State v. Pelser, 182 Iowa 1,
163 N.W. 600 (1917).
7. Insanity at the time of the occurrence testified to is sometimes treated as
a factor affecting credibility. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 179 (1859),
noted in 2 WImoORE § 493; McCoRzmcK § 45; 58 Am. JuR., Witnesses § 699
(1948). However, the usual concern is solely with capacity during trial. 2
WIGMORE § 483; and see McConmvcK § 45; Annot., 15 A.L.R. 932 (1921).
8. Medical witnesses (not psychiatrists): McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434
(1850); People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387 (1929); Ellarson v.
Ellarson, 198 App. Div. 103, 190 N.Y. Supp. 6 (3d Dep't 1921); State v.
Pryor, 74 Wash. 121, 132 Pac. 874 (1913). Concerning mental capacity, see
Jeffers v. State, 145 Ga. 74, 88 S.E. 571 (1916); Alleman v. Stepp. 52 Iowa
626, 3 N.W. 636 (1879); State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50 (1950).
Lay witnesses: Holcomb v. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 179 (1859); Rivara v. Ghio, 3
E.D. Smith 264 (N.Y.C.P. 1854). As to mental capacity, see Jones v. State,
165 Miss. 810, 146 So. 138 (1933); McClure v. Fall, 42 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931), affd, 67 S.W.2d 231 (1934); Kellner v. Randle, 165 S.W. 509 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914); Wren v. Howland, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 87, 75 S.W. 894 (1903);
Bouldin v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 419, 222 S.W. 555 (1920). Wigmore states
the test of testimonial capacity on this issue to be whether the impeaching
witness has had "an opportunity, by observation of the conduct of the one
whose mental condition is in issue, to learn something upon the subject and
to form a belief worth listening to." 3 WIGMORE § 689.
9. See the extended discussion in 7 WiGmoRE §§ 1933-38.
10. Since the psychiatrist conceives mind and body to be one entity, he
must study the body as well as the mind. Hence, his considerations must in-
clude medical factors. MENNINGER, PSYCHIATRY 5 (1948); Note, Psychiatric
Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1331 (1950).
11. EWEN, MENTAL HEALTH (1947). The claim that the psychiatrist has
something special to contribute on the issues of competency and credibility
is based upon the psychiatric notion that people suffering from certain types
of mental disease are able to distort the truth in a highly convincing manner,
so that they may testify more persuasively than persons free from extreme
mental disorders. For generalized discussions of the mentally diseased witness,
see GuTTmACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCIATRY AM THE LAW (1952); OVERHOLSER,
THE PSYCAM Tms AN THE LAw (1953). For an excellent short consideration,
see Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1326-31 (1950). Such testimony would be espe-
cially crucial when given, for example, by a purported eye-witness to a crime
or other occurrence, as in State v. Taborsky, 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d 433 (1955).
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condition will affect his tendency or ability to tell the truth.12 For
these reasons, a consideration of some of the evidentiary problems
arising out of the use of psychiatrist's testimony seems proper. The
psychiatric concepts upon, which such testimony is based have been
discussed elsewhere, and little could be added on that subject.13
The problems raised by the psychiatric basis for challenge have been
divided into two groups: those resulting from the particular stage of
the lawsuit at which challenge is made, and those raised by the vary-
ing amounts and accuracy of information upon which psychiatric
testimony may be based. "Credibility" and "competency" will be used
in the normal evidentiary sense, although some psychiatrists may not
agree with lawyers as to the distinctions.14
TIME OF CHALLENGE
A. Before the Witness Testifies.
The challenge of a witness' competency before he testifies15 raises
a question for the court,16 but the applicability of the exclusionary rules
to evidence offered to overcome the general presumption of testimonial
capacity 7 has not been made clear by the decisions. 18 Although no
cases have been found which discuss what constitutes acceptable
evidence of mental incompentency, 19 such matters apparently are left
12. For an interesting psychiatric treatment of the phenomenon of lying,
pointing out its wide prevalence and the consequent question as to a satis-
factory definition, see Karpman, Lying, a Minor Inquiry into the Ethics of
Neurotic and Psychopathic Behavior, 40 J. CRnvi. L., C. & P.S. 135 (1949).
13. Karpman, supra note 12; Lipton, The Psychopath, 40 J. CniM. L., C. & P.S.
584 (1950); Roche, Truth Telling, Psychiatric Expert Testimony and the
Impeachment of Witnesses, 22 PENN. B.A.Q. 140 (1951); Note, 19 TENN. L.
REv. 361 (1946); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1950); GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN,
op. cit. supra note 11; OVERHOLSER, op. cit. supra note 11.
14. A mentally incompetent witness theoretically cannot tell the truth; a
witness who is able to tell the truth but for some reason does not is said to
be unworthy of credibility. However, some psychiatrists believe that the
previous environmental experiences predetermine all future conduct. MEfN-
NINGER, PsYcImATRY, 50-88 passim (1948). Hence, a "sane" witness who lies
does so because of his previous experiences, which have inclined him away
from telling the truth. Of course, the psychiatrist recognizes varying degrees
of mental disorder, and would agree that some persons would be more likely
to tell the truth than others.
15. As to challenge of competency after the witness testifies, see text infra,"C: After the Trial is Over."
16. See note 3 supra.
17. State v. Barker, 294 Mo. 303, 242 S.W. 405 (1922); MORGAN 78-79;
WIGMORE §§ 484, 497; 58 Am. JuR., Witnesses § 122 (1948).
18. Although Wigmore contends that the rules of evidence are not strictly
enforced in the hearing to pass on the competency of a witness, 2 WIGMoan
§ 487, the reported cases do not support this position. Maguire and Epstein,
Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility, 36 YALE
L.J. 1101 (1927).
19. Wigmore attributes the absence of discussion on this point to a modem
tendency to refuse to distinguish between insanity affecting testimonial
capacity and that affecting credibilty. 2 WIGMORE § 501. See People v. Lam-
bersky, 410 Ill. 451, 102 N.E.2d 326 (1951). The cases apparently give wide
range to the discretion of the trial court, reversing only for refusal to permit
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largely to the discretion of the-trial judge.20 Lay testimony concerning
the effect of mental illnesses on the proposed witness' ability to tell
the truth would seem proper, but the light weight of such testimony
might convince the court that its presentation is not worth while.
Expert testimony would seem much more desirable because of its
greater weight.
The present widely prevalent practice is to have witnesses sworn
as a group at the beginning of the trial2 ' and to challenge competency
for the first time when the witness is called to the stand. 22 Under
these conditions delay of the trial would certainly result if a challenge
to competency based on expert testimony were first made at this point,
especially if more than one or two witnesses were challenged. In the
latter circumstance, a second problem would arise: challenges of
witnesses other than key witnesses might be considered an attempt
to inject issues into the case which are so remote as to be irrelevant.
However, these difficulties do not seem so insurmountable as to pre-
clude the use of psychiatrists' testimony as the basis of a sincere chal-
lenge of opposing witnesses. A pre-trial discovery of the identity of
an opponent's proposed witnesses, as is now possible under Rule 33 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, would permit an effective pre-
trial challenge. And the filing of a witness list, followed by a list of
witnesses to be challenged by the opponent, would permit the court to
have the opinions of its own experts as well as those of the parties.
However, lest such collateral matters occupy an undue amount of a
court's valuable time, the present extremely heavy presumption of
competency 23 should prevail.
B. After the Witness Testifies, But During Trial.
Impeachment, the challenge to credibility during the trial after the
witness testifies, is aimed at discrediting his testimony in the mind of
the finder of fact. In other words, the challenge attempts to convince
the finder that for some reason the witness' testimony has not been a
attempts to disqualify. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. James, 228 Ala. 383,
153 So. 759 (1934); People v. Harrison, 18 Cal. App. 288, 123 Pac. 200 (1912);
People v. Hudson, 341 Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930); Swango v. Commonwealth,
276 Ky. 467, 124 S.W.2d 768 (1939); Bowdle v. Detroit St. Ry., 103 Mich. 272,
61 N.W. 529 (1894); Livingston v. Kiersted, 10 Johns. 362 (N.Y. 1813); Saucier
v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 301, 235 S.W.2d 903 (1950); Coleman v. Common-
wealth, 25 Gratt. 865 (Va. 1874); Reg. v. Hill, 5 Cox C.C. 259, 5 Eng. L. & Eq.
547 (Ct. Crim. App. 1851); see State v. Mohr, 99 N.J.L. 124, 122 Atl. 837
(1923).
20. Wigmore finds the decisions not clear as to what degree of evidence is
necessary in order to compel a determination by the trial judge. "It may
be supposed that a mere objection raised and a claim to have a 'voir dire'
examination would suffice. Moreover the offering of any extrinsic evidence
whatever would suffice ... ." 2 WIGMORE § 497.
21. McComCK § 70.
22. MCCORMICK § 70; 2 WiGMoRE § 486.
23. Sources cited in note 17 supra.
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true representation of the occurrence concerning which he testified.
In the most famous case involving psychiatric testimony, the two
perjury trials of Alger Hiss, the defense attempted at both trials to im-
peach the principal witness for the prosecution, Whittaker Chambers,
by the testimony of two psychiatrists. Although the evidence was
excluded at the first trial,24 it was admitted at the second.25 Contrary
to popular belief, the latter ruling is not particularly novel or startling.
Some courts have admitted the testimony of laymen offered to impeach
a witness, not on the grounds of faulty memory,26 which may or may
not be a product of mental illness, but on the ground that the witness'
mental condition might affect the reliability of his testimony. For
example, in the early case of Rivara v. Ghio,2 7 a New York court held
that a witness should have been permitted to testify concerning the
mental condition of another witness in an attempt at impeachment.
The court noted that although a witness, non compos mentis, was
at that time incompetent to testify, evidence of prior insanity should
have been admitted for purposes of impeachment. However, there
was no indication that the impeachment would be solely on the grounds
of past rather than present insanity. And in the comparatively recent
case of Jones v. State,28 it was held that the trial court committed error
in refusing testimony of a layman to the effect that a witness was not
mentally capable of understanding the solemnity of an oath. Although
no challenge had been made to the witness' compentency, if the ex-
cluded evidence were true, the challenge should have been made before
the witness testified.2 9 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals has consist-
ently admitted lay testimony on the question of mental condition
offered for purposes of impeachment.30
Cases in which similar testimony by doctors was permitted are
legion.31 For example in State v. Pryor,32 a trial court was reversed for
24. The offer at the first Hiss trial is reported in N.Y. Times, July 1, 1949, p.
1, col. 2.
25. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (memorandum
opinion solely on admissibility of the evidence), commented on in Jones,
Admission of Psychiatric Testimony in Alger Hiss Trial, 11 ALA. LAW. 212
(1950).
26. Ability to remember is generally considered a necessary element of
testimonial capacity. See note 5 supra. However, it has been held that a faulty
memory may be a ground for impeachment. Alleman v. Stepp, 52 Iowa 626,
3 N.W. 636 (1879); Wren v. Howland, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 87, 75 S.W. 894 (1903).
Also of interest is Goodwin v. Goodwin, 20 Ga. 600 (1856), holding such testi-
mony improper as an invasion of the province of the jury.
27. 3 E. D. Smith 264 (N.Y.C.P. 1854).
28. 165 Miss. 810, 146 So. 138 (1933).
29. Note 5 supra.
30. McClure v. Fall, 42 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd. 67 S.W.2d
231 (1934); Kellner v. Randle, 165 S.W. 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Wren v.
Howland, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 87, 75 S.W. 894 (1903).
31. E.g., Ingalls v. Ingalls, 257 Ala. 521, 59 So. 2d 898 (1952); McAllister
v. State, 17 Ala. 434 (1850); People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387
(1929); Ellarson v. Ellarson, 198 App. Div. 103, 190 N.Y. Supp. 6 (3d Dep't
1921); Lord v. Beard, 79 N.C. 5 (1878); State v. Pryor, 74 Wash. 121, 132 Pac.
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its exclusion of medical testimony to the effect that the prosecuting
witness was suffering from hysteria at the time an alleged abortion
took place. And-in Derwin v. Parsonsa3 the court found no error in the
admission of testimony by "experts" to the effect that women afflicted
with a disease suffered by the witness often have hallucinations con-
cerning the conduct of men toward them, although there was no
evidence that the witness was suffering from such hallucinations. The
trial court in People v. Cowles34 allowed medical practitioners to testi-
fy without objection that a statutory rape prosecutrix was a pathologi-
cal liar, sex pervert, and nymphomaniac. The state supreme court
held that it was error on the part of the court to exclude further
evidence offered to prove the witness' condition.
In the only case found involving the testimony of a psychologist,
the court refused to admit either her testimony or that of a doctor
to the effect that a statutory rape prosecutrix was mentally incompe-
tent and had a tendency to lie. Evidence of the symptoms present in
the witness was allowed, as was evidence of the personality type which
these symptoms would indicate. But the classification of the prose-
cutrix as a personality type by the impeaching witness was forbidden.3 5
As noted, it was only in recent years that psychiatric testimony
began to appear in court rooms for purposes of impeachment. In all
of the discovered cases such testimony was admitted. An extreme
example is Fries v. Berberich,36 in which a psychiatrist was permitted
to testify that a person involved in an automobile accident would not
under any circumstances become afflicted with retrograde amnesia
covering the period immediately preceding the accident. The defend-
ant driver, who had testified that he was so afflicted, suffered a verdict..
It is, of course, impossible to determine the extent to which the psy-
chiatric testimony influenced the finder of fact. In State v. Wesler,37
a prosecution for carnal knowledge and abuse, the admission of psy-
chiatric testimony to impeach the two prosecuting witnesses at the
trial was summarily approved by the court.
Those cases involving testimony by laymen discussed above do not
represent mere contradictions of one witness by another but outright
874 (1913). See also Jeffers v. State, 145 Ga. 74, 88 S.E. 571 (1916) (admitting
testimony concerning witness' mental age); State v. Pelser, 182 Iowa 1, 163
N.W. 600 (1917) (excluding testimony concerning mental conditions of girls
in period of maturation); Alleman v. Stepp, 52 Iowa 626, 3 N.W. 636 (1879)
(admitting testimony concerning effect of witness' impaired mind on his
memory); State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50 (1950) (admitting
testimony concerning witness' mental age).
32. Note 31 supra.
33. 52 Mich. 425, 18 N.W. 200 (1884).
34. Note 31 supra.
35. State v. Driver, 88 W. Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921).
36. 177 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. App. 1944).
37. 137 N.J.L. 311, 59 A.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1948), afi'd per curiam, 61 A.2d
746 (1948), commented on in 39 J. CRuvt. L., C. & P.S. 750 (1949).
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attacks on credibility, although couched in terms of mental, rather
than moral, abnormality. Statements of opinion by nonexpert wit-
nesses are generally looked upon with disfavor,3 but lay opinions on
the question of insanity are a well-settled exception. 39 In view of these
rules, admission of lay opinions as to testimonial capacity should not
be surprising. However, since many jurisdictions refuse to admit
testimony offered to contradict an impeaching witness, 40 there is the
danger that a convincing but mentally diseased witness will testify
that a principal witness, an "enemy" of the challenger, did not tell the
truth.41
The testimony of the general practitioner4 2 is less dubious than that
of a layman but still not so desirable as that of the expert who has
concluded an adequate examination of the witness.43 A refusal or in-
ability to relate what most people would believe to be the truth, both
as a symptom and as a consequence of mental disorder, is within
training and study of the expert, and he certainly should be qualified
to testify as to the probability that the witness will tell the truth.
However, the possibility of error on his part places on opposing counsel
a burden of rigorous cross-examination.
The possible liberal admission of such expert testimony often gives
rise to a warning that a "battle of the experts" will result. One argu-
ment on this point, to the effect that experts would ultimately be sub-
stituted for fact-finders, may be answered by pointing out that judges
and juries often resolve inconsistencies in other forms of expert testi-
mony and that it would not be unreasonable to assume that they could
resolve conflicts in psychiatric testimony equally well.44 Another
argument, especially pertinent to the present discussion, is that to
admit such testimony freely would result in occupying too much
of the court's time with a collateral issue. However, nothing would
prevent the court's limiting the number of such witnesses.
38. The difference between "opinion" and "fact" in an evidentiary sense
is, of course, one of degree. For discussions of the so-called ouinion rule and all
of its implications, see McComvacK §§ 10-12; MORGAN 191-97: 7 WIaMORE
§§ 1917-29; 20 Am. JuR., Evidence § 765 (1939); 32 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 438
et seq. (1942).
39. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 179 (1859); Rivara v. Ghio, 3 E. D. Smith
264 (N.Y.C.P. 1854); 7 WIGMORE §§ 1933-34; 20 Am. JUR., Evidence § 852 (1939);
32 C.J.S., Evidence § 507 (1942).
40. Wigmore points out that to permit such practice would lead to an endless
parade of witnesses on a collateral matter. 3 WIGMORE § 894. And see
MORGAN 71.
41. This danger was dramatically illustrated in State v. Taborsky, infra
note 45.
42. The term "general practitioner" is here used to include all non-psy-
chiatrist members of the medical profession, and not in the technical con-
notation used by the profession.
43. As to what constitutes an adequate examination, see discussion of "Bases
of Challenge" in text infra.
44. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1338 (1950).
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C. After the Trial is Over.
In the recent case of State v. Taborsky,45 a new trial was granted to a
defendant under sentence of death for murder, after the conviction
had been affirmed by the state court of last resort, when it was dis-
covered that at the time of the trial the principal witness for the state
was suffering from a mental disability which made him prone to lie
aggressively against the defendant.46 In granting a new trial the court
commented that "if the [trial] court, after a proper consideration of the
evidence as to [the witness'] sanity, were to admit his testimony, the
evidence of his mental condition before, at and after the occurrence
of [the crime], and at the time of the trial would be available for the
jury to use in passing on his credibility."47 Upon a second trial, the
defendant was acquitted.
48
Any challenge of a witness after completion of the trial would be
useful only as a basis for a motion for a new trial on the ground that
the witness' incompetency or lack of credibility, unknown at the time
of the trial,49 would materially affect the ultimate result in the case
by changing the weight rather than the mere quantity of the evi-
dence. 0 Courts are extremely reluctant to grant new trials on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, 51 which seems proper in view
of the time and expense involved in a trial. At least one jurisdiction
holds this ground sufficient in civil cases only.5 2 But if it subsequently
appears that a key witness was suffering from a severe mental con-
dition affecting competency at the time of the trial, the better view
would seem to be that there must be a new trial, especially in capital
criminal cases. The discretion of the courts53 should prove adequate
assurance that such a rule would not appreciably endanger the finality
of judgments generally.
45. 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d 433 (1955).
46. The overt manifestations of the condition did not appear until after the
conclusion of the trial, and there was a disagreement among the psychiatrists
who testified as to the state of advancement of the condition at the time of the
trial. 116 A.2d at 436-37.
47. 116 A.2d at 437. But see People v. Brown, 289 P.2d 880 (Cal. App. 1955);
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 865 (Va. 1874).
48. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 15, 1955, p. 19, col. 1.
49. The moving party must show that he was unaware of the evidence at the
time of the trial, and that he could not have discovered the evidence by the
exercise of due diligence in order to sustain a motion for a new trial. Fred-
ricksen v. Luthy, 72 Idaho 164, 238 P.2d 430 (1951); 39 Am. JUn., New Trial
§§ 159, 160 (1942); 66 C.J.S., New Trial §§ 103, 104 (1950).
50. Taylor v. Ross, 150 Ohio St. 448, 83 N.E.2d 222 (1948); 39 Am. JuR., New
Trial § 156 (1942); 66 C.J.S., New Trial § 113 (1950).
51. Taylor v. Ross, supra note 50; 39 Am. JuR., New Trial § 156 (1942); 66
C.J.S., New Trial § 101 (1950).
52. State v. Lee, 80 Iowa 75, 45 N.W. 545 (1890) (interpreting a state statute
providing a statutory new trial).
53. A motion for a new trial is generally addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial judge and will be reversed only for a clear abuse of such dis-
cretion. 66 C.J.S., New Trial § 201 (1950) and sources cited in note 50 supra.
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The question would be more difficult when only the credibility of
a key witness is challenged. Obviously, if the mental condition alleged
were of mild effect on credibility, a new trial would not seem neces-
sary. On the other hand, if the condition is of such severity as materi-
ally to affect credibility, but not so severe as to render the witness in-
competent, a new trial would probably be advisable.M Again, the best
possible answer-admittedly inexact-would seem to be reliance on
the discretion of the trial court.
The qualifications of the challenger on a motion for new trial should
be as high, if not higher, than those required for a challenge to com-
petency.55 Otherwise, dissatisfied litigants and crusaders might be
permitted to clog the courts with lay "experts" engaged, with various
motives, in attempts to salvage lawsuits or save "innocent" lives. Dif-
ferent policy considerations may well give rise to different rules in
civil and criminal cases.
BASES FOR CHALLENGE
What degree of knowledge is necessary in order for a person to testi-
fy that a witness is psychiatrically inclined not to tell the truth? Since
the lay witness must always testify from his own knowledge, 6 op-
posing counsel may be counted upon to insure that such an opinion
has some foundation in fact. However, the expert is in a different
position. First, because he is an expert his testimony may carry more
than its true weight in the mind of the finder of fact. And secondly,
he may answer questions based on assumed conditions-the much-
discussed hypothetical question.
When the expert testifies from his own knowledge, opposing counsel
should insure that such knowledge is reasonably complete and not
the result of hasty or cursory examination. In the Alger Hiss case,57
one psychiatrist testified on the basis of the witness' conduct in court
during the trial and on writings of the witness previously read by the
psychiatrist.5 8 Since the process of complete psychoanalysis may take
as long as two hundred and fifty hours,59 the validity of such testimony
would seem open to question. Although it may be possible after a short
examination to form an accurate expert opinion of an individual's
mental condition as it may affect his ability and desire to tell the
54. The Connecticut court in the Taborsky case was not clear as to whether
the witness' competency or his credibility was affected by his mental con-
dition. The answer apparently is that the determination was for the trial
court on the new trial.
55. See text preceding material supported by notes 21 and 22 supra.
56. Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Marsh, 63 Ohio St. 236, 58 N.E.
821 (1900); McComvRrcK § 10; 2 WIOMoRE §§ 650 et seq.
57. Discussed supra, notes 24 and 25.
58. GuTTmAcnm An WEmOFEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 364.
59. Id. at 7.
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truth,60 questions put to a witness on the stand, usually undirected and
immaterial insofar as mental condition is concerned, hardly seem an
adequate basis for the formulation of an opinion. Even if, as one writer
has suggested,61 the psychiatrist were to direct the examination of the
witness, it is doubtful that the examination could be sufficiently
thorough without consuming an undue amount of the court's time.
Nor does the hypothetical question seem a sound device. In addition
to being subject to abuse by the posing of confusing and often contra-
dictory ass.mptions,62 it casts upon the jury the burden of determining
the truth or falsity of the hypothesis upon which the question is based.6 3
Thus the jury, given the barest of tools, is asked to form a psychiatric
opinion of the witness-a task not lightly undertaken by a trained
psychiatrist.64 In view of these problems, the ultimate determination
as to what constitutes an adequate mental examination may well be
left to the psychiatrists. But effective cross-examination of the psy-
chiatrist by opposing counsel should provide a considerable degree of
control.
It has been suggested that a pre-trial examination of the proposed
witness is advisable, where necessary, as a prerequisite to testifying.6 5
The objection that this procedure would unduly delay the trial of a
case should be overcome by proper pre-trial procedures; but a serious
question would arise as to the power of the court to compel a mere
witness, not a party, to submit to such an examination in view of the
resultant invasion of privacy and possible self-incrimination.
66
Finally, assuming a thorough pre-trial examination of the witness
as the basis for an expert opinion aimed at disqualification or im-
peachment, the question arises as to the extent to which the psy-
chiatrist may be compelled to reveal particular facts which his exam-
ination may have disclosed. An expert qualified to state his conclusions
as testimony must reveal the particular facts upon which he bases
his opinion, assuming that the facts have been revealed to him by his
60. Some psychoanalysts believe that complete psychoanalysis can be com-
pleted in a period as short as six weeks. Id. at 8.
61. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1334 (1950).
62. For an extreme example, see HuLBERT, Psychiatric Testimony in Pro-
bate Proceedings, 2 LAw & Co~rraysP. PROB. 448, 455 (1935), quoted in GUTT-
VACHER AND WEIOFEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 225.
63. MORGAN 197; 2 WIGmORE § 680.
64. Gu=AHmCa AND WmaOEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 7-8.
65. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1339 (1950). Several jurisdictions have required
such an examination when a criminal defendant seeks to avail himself of the
defense of insanity, and have held that such an examination does not violate
the privilege against self-incrimination. Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d
1109 (1933); Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944); State v.
Coleman, 96 W. Va. 544, 123 S.E. 580 (1924); all cited, together with other
cases in GuTTMAcHER A WmorEN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 286.
66. For a suggestion that the results of such an examination ought to be
privileged, see sources cited in note 71, infra.
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examination,67 either as a predicate for the stating of the conclusion G8
or upon cross-examination. 69 Although the psychiatrist may not be
required to reveal his discoveries in any but very broad terms, since
his conclusions are based upon a mass of individually insignificant
facts,70 rigorous adverse cross-examination could conceivably result in
revealing facts irrelevant to the case but extremely damaging and
even incriminating to the witness. In view of the spirit and intent
of the psychiatric interview, this result would be highly undesirable.
An extension of the much maligned doctor-patient privilege7' would
seem an advisable shield in these circumstances, especially if, as sug-
gested above,72 psychiatric examination were made a prerequisite to
the receipt of testimony from a questioned witness. In those instances.
in which reluctance on the part of the patient to talk freely is over-
come by the use of narcotics and hypnotics,73 compelling the psychia-
trist to reveal the facts thus learned might well violate the privilege
against self-incrimination.7 4
Present rules, together with an extension of the doctor-patient
privilege, would, therefore, seem sufficient to prevent subversion of
psychiatric testimony into an indirect and scientific third-degree.
CONCLUSION
Psychiatric examination is another, improved method for discover-
ing the truth. However, it is certainly not infallible, and its limits
should be recognized. Insofar as its use might jeopardize any of the
basic safeguards of personal liberty established by common law, it
should be rigidly controlled. It should be used only as a tool in the
search for truth and not as a substitute for the judgment of a court
67. This will be the case except when the psychiatrist is posed a hypothetical
question.
68. MCCORMICK § 14; 58 Am. Jun., Witnesses § 844 (1948).
69. Adams v. Ristine, 138 Va. 273, 122 S.E. 126 (1924); McCoRMICK § 14; 58
Am. Jun., Witnesses § 844 (1948).
70. Obviously two hundred fifty hours of interview, supra note 59, cannot
produce too many individually important facts when the ultimate diagnosis
is based upon the entire series of interviews.
71. This privilege is purely statutory and exists in about two-thirds of the
American jurisdictions. McCORMICK § 101; MORGAN 109; 8 WIGMORE § 2380.
Presently the privilege covers only information obtained in the course of
diagnosis and contemplation of treatment. McCoRMIcx § 102; MORGAN 110-11;
8 WIGMORE § 2382. But Guttmacher and Weihofen cite two instances in which
the desired extension has been made: an unreported Illinois trial court ruling
and Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 319.110 (Baldwin 1948). Actually the Kentucky
statute concerns clinical psychologists rather than psychiatrists. GUTTMACHER
AND WEiHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 11, 269-70 (refers to case only), previously
published in substance in Comment, 28 IND. L.J. 32, 33, 36 (1952). Tennessee
also established such a privilege in 1953. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1117 (1956).
72. See text supported by note 65 supra.
73. This procedure is referred to in GuTTMACHER AND WEXHOFEN, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 105.
74. This privilege is discussed at length in McCoRMIcK §§ 120-36; and 8
WIGMORE §§ 2250-84. See also MORGAN 127 if.
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as to the competency of a witness, or the determination of a jury
as to the credibility of a witness. There is a very real danger that the
successes of medicine will be so unduly stressed as to obscure the
failures, and that individual rights may fall victim to the sanctity
of science. Psychiatric testimony carries both dangers. Its use should
be widespread, subject to continuous and rigid scrutiny by both coun-
sel and court.
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